Abstract: This article examines crime control in post-Communist states.
I. Introduction
Security is certainly a puzzle -the state's guarantee to ensure law and order is an important promise to society, and one laden with controversy. Critical questions concerning the transformation of crime control models, the reasons underpinning particular decisions and their ensuing consequences, are not only alluring, but paramount. 'The worldview has long since been overlaid by a desire for security that relies upon false promises by governments and wilful blindness to the facts of crime by individuals…it is a puzzle why the myth of personal safety is so powerful and enduring'. trying to assert a strong lead in shaping respective CEE crime control models, a current examination of security in Europe shows that Europe itself has ente an uncertain terrain, sending conflicting messages to CEE countries that reflect warm welcome and, at the same time, an evident concern related to its borders.
The resulting notion of Europe's 'fortress mentality' arose from tensions between the internal and external security policies of the EU, an area governed by a branch of the EU that has undergone serious reform. 9 As noted by Grabbe, 'justice and home affairs is a policy area renowned for its obscurity and lack of transparency in public debate '. 10 This puzzle of security is not complete without exploring the location and use of fear. Some 'transitologists' and other scholars of post-totalitarian and postauthoritarian societies claim that remnants of Communist rule have shaped and transformed themselves in ways that effect the setting up of democratic rule.
11
Nowhere is this clearer that the area of crime control.
The first part of this article considers crime control under former Communist rule. Crime control was an important part of a repressive criminal justice system and the criminal law was utilised as an instrumental tool.
12
Punishment was an important component of maintaining law and order and repressive measures were used against specific targets (namely political opposition) and symbolically (such as in the case of the crime of vagrancy or speculation). 13 The use of harsh and repressive punishment under Communist rule reveals that security operated as an illusion on two levels: the promise of law and order on the part of the state and the unique picture of crime projected both as a fear and non-existent feature of the state. 14 the CEE, for nearly forty years the 'state was central to the Soviet communism and, therefore, any research on what followed that system has to account for the transformation of the old state's structures and mentality'. 20 Łoś aptly notes that the Soviet state's domain once entailed public spaces that are now viewed as private spaces or property. This includes the area of criminal justice. The type of crime control model that was established under Communist rule was based on Marxist-Leninist ideology. For a brief but significant time this ideology was dictated by Stalinist thought (1944) (1945) (1946) (1947) (1948) (1949) (1950) (1951) (1952) (1953) . 21 This was characterised by a regime that mirrored the 'cult of personality' that shaped Soviet Communist rule. 22 Even before the Second World War ended, the region's criminal law policies were created by provisional governments set up in the region, which passed decrees that were for the most part ordained by th 
Crime control and fear
Indeed, at the heart of the crime control model that was imposed on CEE states was fear. 'Fear was the first principle buttressing Soviet-style control. A key to communist societies' stability was the well-internalised fear of the party-state and its seemingly omnipresent security forces'. 35 In this constellation, the 'multiple relations of power traverse, characterize, and constitute the social body; they are indissociable from a discourse of truth…' 36 Judt notes that Eastern European politics and government became equated with corruption and indiscriminate suppression, 'practiced by and for the benefit of a venal clique, itself rent by suspicion and fear'.
37
From the citizens' perspective, crime took on a paradoxical meaning. Łoś describes how the imprisonment of a parent owing to membership in the opposition movement could be seen as heroic among peers and the outside. (anxiety). 44 Bourke discusses how the uncertainty of anxiety can be addressed by naming an enemy (i.e. 'them') a process which transforms anxiety into fear.
Thus, debates about crime can be a reflection of change more generally Previous research has demonstrated that the collapse of the Communist regime has left particular bonds of resistance meaningless and replaced them with new threats, manifested in the rising crime rates, which necessitate new strategies and ways of coping. 56 These new strategies rely on old and well-used methods which on the part of Polish society involves retaining the label of 'them' as concerns the state apparatus.
European identity and crime control
This label has been used to identify pro-European policies. 57 European identity itself is a notion fraught with confusion. As concerns its identity in the criminal law area, research has revealed a cosmopolitanism that attaches itself to the identity of 'others' and the moral suffering the 'others' experience at the hands of states that do not reflect the European 'civilisation'. 58 
Post-communist states and crime control
Concerning the punitive nature of CEE societies, in the area of punishment the majority of the CEE population has supported the death penalty for over a news reports, crime coverage is uncensored and, in addition, the criminal jus apparatus is 'exposed' in its failures. While the media tends to focus on the sensational cases of failure, the public is left with a negative, general impression of a system that is characterised by chaos and corruption. The public perceptio that crime is increasing is reinforced this way. Crime control is an issue that is publicly discussed and part of political rhetoric. 103 Dissolution with democracy can lead to alternative modes of owicz, see the once-important intelligentsia failing it its responsibility in the democratic process in the CEE region. 100 The increase in crime has a 'destructive potential [. . .], as it leads to high publicity and has the ability to generate negative and often romanticised deviant stereotypes that call for imitation and following.' 101 By generating an inte in society, the erosion of trust in the ability of the criminal justice system to offe adequate protection is compromised. This sort of discourse of political legitimation that has been adopted by the media and politicians is reflected 
